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controversy. Thus, in order to establish T (via something like the argument I
have considered here), Varzi would have to address that controversy and
show that the universalist as such is committed to SD1*. But this he has
not done.5
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Mental ownership and higher-order thought:
Response to Rosenthal
TIMOTHY LANE AND CALEB LIANG1
Mental ownership concerns who experiences a mental state. According to
David Rosenthal (2005: 342), the proper way to characterize mental owner-
ship is: ‘being conscious of a state as present is being conscious of it as
belonging to somebody. And being conscious of a state as belonging to
somebody other than oneself would plainly not make it a conscious state’.
In other words, if a mental state is consciously present to a subject in virtue
of a higher-order thought (HOT), then the HOT necessarily represents
5 In writing this paper, I have benefited from comments by an anonymous referee for this
journal and from correspondence with Achille Varzi. Thanks to both of them for their
help.
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the subject as the owner of the state. But, we contend, one of the lessons
to be learned from pathological states like somatoparaphrenia is that
conscious awareness of a mental state does not guarantee first-person
ownership. That is to say, conscious presence does not imply mental
ownership.
According to Rosenthal’s (2005: 4) transitivity principle, mental states are
conscious only if one is in some way aware of them. He champions the view
that this principle is implemented by HOTs. Succinctly, the HOTs in virtue of
which a mental state can become conscious have the content, ‘I am in a
certain state’ (Rosenthal 2005: 343). As he (2005: 343–44) emphasizes,
this awareness of a state as present seems ‘direct’ and ‘unmediated’. The
notion of self here is minimalist, just a ‘raw bearer’. This leaves room for
the possibility that one can describe oneself incorrectly. According to
Rosenthal’s ‘battery model’ (2005: 345–48), I might misattribute contingent
properties (e.g. personal history) to myself. I might, say, believe myself to be
Barack Obama. Nevertheless, Rosenthal highlights the point that we are
immune to error as regards the raw bearer (Rosenthal 2005: 354–60).
According to this version of immunity, the ‘Thin Immunity Principle’ (TIP),
‘when I have a conscious pain, I cannot be wrong about whether it’s I who
I think is in pain . . . I cannot represent my conscious pain as belonging to
someone distinct from me’ (2005: 357). HOTs necessarily refer to both the
first-order mental state and the owner, who can be none other than self.
Conjunction of the battery model and TIP implies that I can describe
myself inaccurately, but I cannot represent my conscious mental states as
belonging to someone else.
Liang and Lane (2009), however, have argued that empirical evidence can
be adduced to refute this claim. Specifically, in the case of a patient (FB)
suffering from somatoparaphrenia (a syndrome in which one feels alienated
from parts of one’s body) accompanied by tactile extinction (in the alien body
part), conscious perception was recovered when the patient was advised that
somebody other than herself would be touched (Bottini et al. 2002). As the
result of a right hemisphere stroke, FB came to believe that her left hand
belonged to her niece. In a series of controlled experiments, whenever that
hand was touched, FB felt nothing (Part I). She was not mistaken about her
identity, was fully oriented in space and time, and evinced no other
indications of mental deterioration. But, surprisingly, upon being told
that her niece’s hand would be touched, FB experienced tactile sensation
(Part II).
We suggest that the concept of mental ownership plays a critical role in
explaining the dramatic experiential contrast between Parts I and II. It is
our contention that FB’s case is best explained by distinguishing mental own-
ership from conscious presence. Even when characterizing FB’s case in a
way that is maximally consistent with HOT theory, it seems that although
a tactile sensation is consciously present to her in Part II, her HOT does
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not represent her as the owner. We have argued that this constitutes a
counter-example to Rosenthal’s view.
Rosenthal (2010) proposes two criticisms of our view. First, he claims ‘it’s
not at all obvious what representing a state as being present to oneself con-
sists in apart from representing the state as belonging to oneself. So it’s
unclear what their distinction amounts to’. Second, he argues that FB’s
recovery of tactile sensation can be explained by HOT theory without violat-
ing TIP. We begin with the second objection.
Rosenthal (2010) argues that ‘There are two kinds of ownership’:
(a) ‘whom a sensation subjectively belongs to’, and (b) ‘the apparent bodily
location of the sensation’. To illustrate this distinction he cites the phenom-
enon of phantom limb: ‘In addition to being aware of bodily sensations as
one’s own, we are aware of such sensations as having some bodily location;
pains, for example, subjectively seem to be in a hand, foot or other body
part.’ He understands this apparent location as just one among various quali-
tative aspects of the pain; in the same way that pains can be sharp, dull or
throbbing, so too they can seem to be located in the head, the chest or a limb
that doesn’t exist. On this characterization, (a) is unaffected. Those who
experience phantom pain, still experience the pain as their own.
Rosenthal regards FB’s case as analogous to phantom limb. He says that
because FB is aware of the sensation in a ‘spontaneous, unmediated way’, it
follows that ‘she is aware of the sensation as being her own’. It is just that this
particular sensation has a subjective location in her niece’s rather than in her
body. So the idea is that, although (b) is misrepresented, (a) is not. On this
view, Liang and Lane fail to recognize subjective bodily location as an alter-
native and legitimate notion of mental ownership. Accordingly, FB’s case can
be accommodated by HOT, without violating TIP.
We disagree. First, to claim that spontaneous, unmediated awareness
somehow implies that mental ownership can never be misrepresented is to
beg the question. It is one thing to say that, in Part II, FB has a HOT that
enables her to have spontaneous and unmediated awareness of the tactile
sensation. It is something else to say that FB’s HOT represents her, from the
first-person point of view, as being the owner of that sensation. The inferen-
tial leap from premiss to conclusion is substantial: it should not be assumed
that subjective spontaneity or apparent absence of mediation guarantees
mental ownership. Liang and Lane’s objection is precisely that – the two
are not necessarily related in this way.
Second, when applying TIP to the case of pain, Rosenthal (2010) argues:
‘No error is possible about whom I am aware of as having the pain because
the spontaneous awareness tacitly identifies the bearer of the pain with the
bearer of the awareness’. The problem is, again, there is a gap in this argu-
ment. It leaves a critical question unanswered – why can’t identification of
the bearer of the pain by spontaneous awareness go astray? As Rosenthal has
repeatedly emphasized in his writings (e.g. 2002 and 2005), one of the main
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virtues of his theory of consciousness is that HOTs can misrepresent.2 Indeed,
HOT theory allows for the possibility of describing mental states that do not
even exist. Given that HOTs, ex hypothesi, must refer to both a mental state
and to the state’s owner, and given that HOTs can be completely wrong
about the first order state to which they refer, it is arbitrary to insist that
HOTs cannot be wrong about mental ownership. Liang and Lane’s conten-
tion is that HOTs can misrepresent not only the content of first-order mental
states but also the subject.3 Spontaneous awareness can obtain in the absence
of mental ownership.
Third, Rosenthal takes subjective bodily location to be an alternative
notion of mental ownership. But this is mistaken. Note that he treats sub-
jective bodily location as ‘an aspect of the qualitative character of bodily
sensations’. In other words, where the subject feels the sensation is regarded
as part of the content of the sensation, i.e. part of what the subject experi-
ences. For the sake of argument, we can allow that phantom limb might be
explainable in these terms, and that ‘we must understand this apparent
location as a qualitative aspect of the pain’.4 The problem is, if this view is
adopted, it would be a mistake to use subjective bodily location to explain
somatoparaphrenia. The two cases are not analogous: in phantom limb who
feels the pain is not at issue. The qualitative character of bodily sensations is
about what the subject experiences, namely the content of first-order mental
state, not about who that subject is. Explaining who in terms of what,
treating the former as merely derivative from the latter, is to mischaracterize
the phenomenological perplexity of mental ownership. Location and belong-
ingness are distinct. In sum, Rosenthal’s objection fails because he has not
established subjective bodily location as a legitimate alternative notion of
mental ownership.
Recall that Rosenthal’s first objection is that it is unclear what our distinc-
tion between conscious presence and mental ownership ‘amounts to’. One
way of responding to this worry is by unpacking the distinction in terms of
his theory. For the sake of argument we can agree with Rosenthal on the
following points: (1) For every mental state there must be a subject. (2) The
subject is aware of conscious mental states in virtue of having suitable HOTs,
such that awareness of those mental states seems unmediated and spontan-
eous. (3) Every conscious mental state is consciously present to the subject.
But (1)–(3) do not imply that every mental state is represented, from the
2 Rosenthal (2005: 8) touts this as a clear advantage that his implementation of the tran-
sitivity principle has over rival implementations, like inner-sense models.
3 Liang and Lane (2009) have previously shown that Rosenthal’s battery model of self-
identification does not prevent TIP from being violated, at least as regards the case of FB.
4 Although we do not argue the point here, some theories, like Melzack’s (1989) ‘neuroma-
trix’, suggest that Rosenthal’s approach might even fail to adequately account for phantom
limb phenomena (both pain and other sensations).
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first-person point of view, as belonging to the subject, the one who is cur-
rently aware of it in a spontaneous, unmediated way. Thus it can be seen that
HOT theory itself allows for the possibility that TIP can be violated. And as
FB’s case shows, when Rosenthal (2005: 357) proclaims that ‘one cannot be
wrong about whether the individual that seems to be in pain is the very same
as the individual for whom that pain is conscious’, he is mistaken. No aspect
of HOT theory can be enlisted to justify Rosenthal’s inference from presence
to ownership.
Why is allowing for the presence-ownership distinction so important? Our
exchange with Rosenthal is not – and we believe Rosenthal would heartily
agree – merely a parochial, philosophical dispute. Wittgenstein (1969:
66–67) once famously claimed that to ask of a person who reports being
in pain ‘are you sure that it’s you who have pains?’ would be nonsensical.
Most contemporary philosophers have taken this remark to be undeniably
true. Wittgenstein, we contend, was wrong. It would not necessarily be non-
sensical. On the contrary such questions should sometimes be asked.
Getting clear about the conceptual issues in this vicinity is essential to
making progress on a host of challenging empirical issues. One important
role for philosophy, which remains underdeveloped, is to elucidate concepts
with an eye towards motivating directed, fruitful inquiry, in both clinical and
experimental contexts. Consider again FB’s recovery from tactile extinction
in Part II. Motivated by realization that spontaneous awareness does not
guarantee ownership, a clinician might have pursued an additional line of
questioning. Adequate investigation of FB’s perplexing phenomenal experi-
ence would require that she be asked the Wittgenstein question, albeit in
slightly recast form, to wit: ‘Are you sure it is you who is feeling your
niece’s sensation?’
Somatoparaphrenia is surprisingly common, some reports (e.g. Baier and
Karnath 2008) indicating that it occurs in as many as 8% of acute stroke
patients with right brain damage. The presence-ownership distinction
espoused here, we suggest, can motivate a research programme that combines
well-designed questions and varied stimuli. For example, probes similar to
those employed in the Cambridge Depersonalization Scale (Sierra and Berrios
2000) could help to evince and render reportable the rich phenomenological
complexity. Along with this scale, multifarious stimuli should be applied. The
tactile tests on FB can be supplemented with, for instance, the cold pressor
pain test (e.g. Mitchell et al. 2004), aiming for a more refined, nuanced
understanding of her phenomenology.
Making salient the distinction between mental ownership and conscious
presence, and wielding these notions perspicaciously, is a significant way in
which philosophy can contribute to the development of revelatory empirical
inquiry. To illustrate with a current dispute among neuroscientists, Feinberg
et al. (2010) have recently criticized the Geschwind–Gazzaniga account of
somatoparaphrenia as incapable of explaining the ‘bizarre aspects of the
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confabulations displayed by our somatoparaphrenia patients’. He proposes
an alternative account that has clear implications for distinguishing between
the neuranatomical substrates of asomatognosia and somatoparaphrenia.
Proper evaluation of these competing empirical accounts, we submit, requires
that serious attention be given to those ‘bizarre aspects’, most notably the
phenomenology of mental ownership.5
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